TROUBLE ABROAD: MICROSOFT'S ANTITRUST PROBLEMS UNDER THE
LAW OF THE EUROPEAN UNION

Justin O'Dell*
I. INTRODUCTION

The European Union, after receiving complaints from software manufacturers, has announced it will begin proceedings against Microsoft Corporation
for abuse of a dominant position through discriminatory licensing and refusal
to supply information regarding its software.' This action pursued by the
European Union presents both similarities and differences with the pending
antitrust action being pursued by the U.S. Justice Department. The U.S.
antitrust action charges, interalia,that Microsoft improperly tied its operating
system and its internet browser in order to preserve its market power and
leverage its way into the web browser market.' The allegations made by the
European Union involve Microsoft's actions in extending its dominance in the
personal computer operating systems market into the server operating systems
market.4 Microsoft will face a very different legal challenge in Europe
compared to its current legal problems in the United States since the two
systems of antitrust law have developed in dramatically different ways.'
However, based on the findings of fact in the U.S. District Court, it is possible
to predict what an ultimate determination in the European Union would be
against Microsoft.
Historically, actions pursued on both sides of the Atlantic Ocean provide
a background from which to predict further the outcome of the action. In the
1950s, the United States brought an antitrust suit against International
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See Dominance: EUAccuses Microsoft ofAbusing Dominance to Squeeze Out Rivals,
BNA ANTITRUST & TRADE REGULATION DAILY, Aug. 14, 2000, at D6 [hereinafter
Dominance].
2 See id.
See Dustin Rowles, Is it a Tie-in or an Integration? U.S. v. Microsoft Weighs In, 6 B.U.
J.Sci. &TECH. L. 12, 1 (2000).
4 See Dominance, supra note 1, at D6.
' See generally Spencer Weber Waller, Understanding and Appreciating EC Competition

Law 61 ANTITRUST L.J. 55 (1992) (stating that, unlike the U.S. economy, which was largely
integrated and continental in scope at the time of the passage of the Sherman Act in 1890, the
EC was created in 1957 in order to establish a new European common market and to promote
harmony and increase the standard of living).
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Business Machines (IBM).6 The prosecution of IBM would continue in
various forms until 1982, with some issues not ultimately resolved until 1995.,
IBM also faced prosecution on similar grounds by the European Union.! The
outcomes of the cases were dramatically different, and this difference can be
used as an historical example of antitrust practices of each of the respective
regions and a possible indicator of potential results in the pending Microsoft
actions. An analysis of European Union statutes, case law and public policy
goals can also provide a framework for predicting the outcome of the current
action. Through this prediction, comparisons between the U.S. and E.U.
antitrust systems can be drawn. Given the combination of these factors, it is
likely that, while the American case continues into its eleventh year, European
courts will find Microsoft in violation of competition laws or force Microsoft
into a quick settlement.
II. MICROSOFT

The actions currently pending in the United States and European Union
court systems are another (and not likely final) chapter in the evolving story
of Microsoft and antitrust prosecutors. A brief overview of the past enforcement actions and resolutions establishes the basis for the current U.S. case
against Microsoft. A synthesis of the current case against Microsoft, now
partially remanded to the D.C. District Court, also provides assistance in

" See In re Int'l Bus. Machs., Corp., 45 F.3d 641,,642 (2nd Cir. 1995) [hereinafter
IBM1995].
' See id.
8 See Case 60/81, Int'l Bus. Machs., Corp. v. Commission, 1981 E.C.R. 2639. The
Commission of the European Communities in the European Court of Justice initiated the
proceedings. At the time the proceedings were initiated, the European Union was known as the
European Economic Community. Id. The E.E.C. was formally established by the Treaty
Establishing the European Economic Community. See TREATY ESTABLISHING THE EUROPEAN
ECONOMIC COMMUNITY, March 25,1957,298 U.N.T.S. 1l, amendedby TREATYON EUROPEAN
UNION, Feb. 7, 1992,31 I.L.M. 247, [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. 719 (1992). Although some differences
do exist between the two entities, for the purposes of this discussion, the reference will be made
to the European Union, which was formally established by treaty in 1992. See TREATY

Feb. 7, 1992, O.J. (C 224) 1 [1992], 1 C.M.L.R.
573 (1992) [hereinafter EC TREATY], amended by TREATY OF AMSTERDAM AMENDING THE
ESTABLISHING THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY,

TREATY ON EUROPEAN UNION, THE TREATIES ESTABLISHING THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES AND

CERTAIN RELATED

ACTS, Oct. 2, 1997, O.J. (C 340) 1 (1997) [hereinafter

AMsTERDAM

The Amsterdam Treaty reconfigured and renumbered the original European Union
Treaty. The newly numbered Articles that will be applied in this article are Article 81 (ex 85)
and Article 82 (ex 86). The new numbering system went into effect on July 1, 1999, thus some
sources involved in this article use the old numbering system.
TREATY].
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establishing the most likely outcomes at home and abroad. Finally, in order
to make a prediction of the end result in the European Union, the findings of
fact entered by the Hon. Judge Penfield Jackson sitting in the D.C. District
Court and the review of those findings by the Circuit Court of Appeals should
be used as a basis for the courts and Commission of the European Union,
although different conclusions of law will be drawn.
A. Microsoft History
Microsoft began providing Microsoft Disk Operating System (MS-DOS)
software in 1981 for IBM personal computers; from this date forward,
Microsoft's competitors began alleging anticompetitive practices by the
company.9 After considerable urging, the Federal Trade Commission began
an investigation in 1990.' ° The FTC, however, reached an ultimate deadlock
regarding whether or not to bring an action against Microsoft and, as a result,
the Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice began an investigation of
its own." In 1994, following an investigation into its practices, Microsoft
entered into a consent decree with the Department of Justice.' 2
Though initially viewed as ineffectual, the consent decree appears to have
more than minimal bite when, in 1997, the Justice Department successfully
pursued an action against Microsoft for violations of portions of the consent
decree. 3 The victory proved short-lived, however, as a court of appeals in a
split decision reversed the holding of the district court.' 4 Essential to the
court's ruling was a finding that Microsoft's Internet Explorer and Windows
95 were "integrated products" and thus protected by a portion of the consent
decree which otherwise generally prohibited bundling practices." Furthermore, the court of appeals ruled that Microsoft had adequately demonstrated
the facially plausible benefits of the Windows 95 and Internet Explorer
combination.' The ruling would ultimately have lingering affects on the
' See John Cassidy, The Force of an Idea, NEW YORKER, January 12, 1998, at 32.
10See id.
" See Norman W. Hawker, Consistently Wrong: The Single Product Issue and The Tying
Claims Against Microsoft, 35 CAL. W. L. REv. 1,1 (1998).

" See id. Judge Stanley Sporkin felt that the decree presented the message that "Microsoft
is so powerful that neither the market nor the Government is capable of dealing with all of its
monopolistic practices," and initially refused to enter the settlement, but was overturned on
appeal. See Cassidy, supra note 9, at 36.
" See United States v. Microsoft Corp., 980 F. Supp. 537 (D.D.C. 1997).
,4 See United States v. Microsoft Corp., 147 F.3d 935 (D.C. Cir. 1998).
Is

See Hawker, supra note 11, at 2.

16See id. at 3.
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follow up Department of Justice action alleging tying practices regarding
Internet Explorer and Windows 98.'7
B. CurrentMicrosoft Situation
In May 1998, the federal and state governments asserted violations of
sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Antitrust Act"8 by monopolization coupled
with anticompetitive conduct and attempted monopolization. 9 Judge Thomas
Penfield Jackson issued findings in November 1999 that Microsoft held a
share of over ninety percent of the relevant market, that high barriers to entry
protect the dominant market share, and that customers do not have a
commercially viable alternative to Windows operating system.20 In April
2000, Judge Jackson issued conclusions that Microsoft-had maintained
monopoly power in the relevant market through anticompetitive practices in
violation of section 1, had attempted to monopolize the web browser market
in violation of section 2, and had illegally tied its web browser to its operating
system in violation of section .2"Judge Jackson also ruled that Microsoft's
licensing arrangements with computer manufacturers and other companies
were not illegal exclusive dealing violations of section 1.'
Judge Jackson did not hold any hearings on remedies, but instead entered
a final judgment in June ordering the split of Microsoft into two organizations,
a remedy stayed until the case reached a conclusion.2 3 Microsoft immediately
appealed the case'"to the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals and the Justice

17

See id.

' See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1 - 2. The relevant portions ofthe Sherman Act for this discussion will
be sections I and 2. 15 U.S.C. § I provides, "Every contract, combination in the form of trust
or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade of commerce among the several States, or with
foreign nations, is declared to be illegal." 15 U.S.C. § 2 provides, "Every person who shall
monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or combine or conspire with any other person or persons,
to monopolize any part of the trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign
nations, shall be deemed guilty of a felony.. ." The remainder of each section provides for
punishment both by fine and criminally.
'9 See Antitrust: Microsoft BriefCharges 'Infected' Trial, 'ProfoundMisunderstanding'of
Antitrust, BNA CORP. COUNSEL DAILY, Nov. 29, 2000, at D4 [hereinafter Infected].
20
2

Law).
2

23

See United States v. Microsoft Corp., 84 F. Supp. 2d 9 (D.D.C. 1999) (Findings of Fact).
See United States v. Microsoft Corp., 87 F. Supp. 2d 30 (D.D.C. 2000) (Conclusions of
See id.
See Infected, supra note 19, at D4.

24 On appeal Microsoft alleged various errors committed by the district court including: the
narrow limitation of the relevant product market to PC operating systems, the finding of
monopoly maintenance through maximizing Internet Explorer's usage at Netscape's expense,
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department moved for immediate Supreme Court review.2 ' In reviewing the
issues, the Supreme Court denied the direct appeal sought by the Department
of Justice and held that the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals should hear the
case.2 6 The circuit court heard the case en banc with the exception of three of
the ten judges who recused themselves for conflicts of interest.27 Microsoft
then reached a settlement with Sun Microsystems regarding the use of Java.28
The settlement terminates all Java licenses held by Microsoft and prevents
Microsoft from using the 'Java compatible" trademark.29
In late June, 2001 the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals entered an opinion
reversing in part, affirming in part and remanding the case for further
proceedings.3 The ruling was considered a victory for Microsoft even though
it upheld the district court's findings of fact and the conclusion that Microsoft
held and unlawfully preserved monopoly power.3 The decision did reverse
the conclusions finding attempted monopolization of the browser market and
a per se violation based on a tying arrangement. 2 The court harshly criticized
the out-of-court conduct of Judge Jackson, including his comments to
members of the media throughout the trial, as evidencing an appearance of
bias.33 The same appeals court then rejected a motion filed by Microsoft to
rehear various elements of the case, sending the case promptly back to the
district court for remedy proceedings. 4

the finding ofno causal connection between the alleged anticompetitive conduct and Microsoft's
maintenance of a monopoly, the holding that Internet Explorer is unlawfully tied to Windows
when Navigator can be and is used with Windows, the holding that agreements and licensing
arrangements violated section 2, failing to hold hearings on relief, and the violation of the Code
ofConduct for Judges by making extrajudicial communications with the press concerning merits
of the case. See Antitrust: Citing Complexity of TrialRecord,Microsoft Urges Justices To Send
Appeal To D.C, Circuit, BNA CORPORATE COUNSEL DAILY, July 28, 2000, at D2 [hereinafter
Complexity]. For more of Microsoft's appellate brief, see Microsoft PressPass,at http://www.
microsoft.com/ presspass/trial/appeals/1 1-27brief-guide.asp (visited Dec. 22, 2000).
2 See Complexity, supra note 24.
2 See Jon Baumgarten etal., Washington Watch, 5 CYBERSPACE LAWYER No. 8, at 21 (Nov.
2000).
27 See id.
2" See Elizabeth Montalbano, It's Java War, Round Two, COMPUTER RESELLER NEWS, Jan.
29, 2001, at 10.
29 See id.

See United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
3' See John Wilke et al., Microsoft Scores a Big Legal Victory, WALL ST. J., June 29, 2001,
atBl.
30

32 See id.

33See id.
' See John Wilke, Microsoft CaseHeads Back to Trial Court,WALL ST. J., Aug. 3, 2001,
at A3.
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C Microsoft and the European Union
The European Union also began an investigation regarding Microsoft and
filed a formal complaint at the same time that the 1994 U.S. action began.3"
The investigation also centered around the licensing restrictions set forth by
Microsoft.3 6 The European Union eventually agreed to a consent decree with
Microsoft identical to the settlement entered in the United States.37 The
Commission of the European Union originally wanted to place stronger
restrictions on Microsoft, but agreed to the less stringent decree negotiated by
the Department of Justice, possibly in the spirit of transatlantic cooperation.3"
The European Union is again facing pressure and potential criticism as the
Microsoft case begins to erode in the U.S.39
D. Microsoft Findingsof Fact
Judge Jackson found the following facts to have been proved by a
preponderance of the evidence, and these facts were not determined to be
clearly erroneous by the court of appeals.'
1. Background
In 1981, Microsoft Corporation began producing an operating system4
known as MS-DOS, which became the predominant operating system for
Intel-compatible personal computers (PCs). 42 In 1985, Microsoft began
producing Windows and followed, in 1995 and 1998, with Windows 95 and
Windows 98 respectively, both marketed as operating systems for PCs with

3S See Sarah Biggers et al., IntellectualPropertyandAntitrust: A Comparisonof Evolution

in the EuropeanUnion and UnitedStates, 22 HASTINGS INT'L &COMP. L. REV. 209,218 (1999).
36 See id.
37 See id.
38 See Per Jebsen & Robert Stevens, Assumptions, Goals andDominant Undertakings: The

Regulation of Competition UnderArticle 86 of the European Union, 64 ANTITRUST L.J. 443,

448 n. 17 (1996).
39 See Deborah Hargreaves, Break-Up Overturned- European Investigation Left Out on a

Limb, FIN. TIMES, June 29, 2001.
See United States v. Microsoft, Corp., 84 F. Supp. 2d 9 (D.D.C. 1999) (Findings of Fact);
4'

United States v. Microsoft, Corp., No. 00-5212, 2001 WL 722502 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
"' Operating systems are software programs that control allocation and use of computer
resources and support software programs (applications) that perform user-oriented tasks. See
United States v. Microsoft, Corp., 84 F. Supp. 2d 9, 12 (D.D.C. 1999).

4 See id. at 13.
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graphical user interface features. 3 Microsoft generates revenue through the
licensing of Windows programs both directly to consumers and on a larger
scale to manufacturers ofPCs." The manufacturers then install Windows onto
the computer,
allowing them to sell the entire, ready to use package to
45
consumers.
2. Relevant Market
No products currently exist, and no products are likely to exist in the near
future, that could act as a substitute to Windows for Intel-compatible PC
operating systems." No other firm could begin to produce Intel-compatible
marketing systems in a way that would provide consumers with an alternative
within a reasonably short period of time."7 Any firm controlling the licensing
of Intel-compatible PC operating systems would be able to charge a price
substantially above competitive levels and leave the price as such without
losing enough customers as to make the action unprofitable."
Consumers are faced with little substitutability with regard to server
operating systems or non-Intel compatible PC operating systems. 49 Server
operating systems are not able to support the broad scope of applications
allowed by Intel-compatible PC operating systems.50 Non-Intel-compatible
PC operating systems are not an alternative product because the cost of
switching operating systems would also include the purchase of a non-Intelcompatible PC.5' Operating systems used in other devices (hand-held
computers, telephones, television boxes and game consoles) can not act in
combination to substitute for an Intel-compatible PC operating system. 2
Neither a single product nor all types in the aggregate provide the same

41 See id.The graphical user interface enables users to perform tasks by selecting icons and
screen items with a mouse. The Windows system was similar to the operating system MACOS
used by Apple Computers. See id.
"See id.
45 See id.

"See United States v. Microsoft, Corp., 84 F. Supp. 2d 9, 14 (D.D.C. 1999). Intel
Compatible PC operating systems are those designed to function with Intel Corporation's
Pentium family of microprocessors or compatible processors. See id.
47 See id.
48 See id.
49 See id. at 14-15.
so See id.
s' See id. at 15.
52

See United States v. Microsoft, Corp., 84 F. Supp. 2d 9, 15 (D.D.C. 1999).
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features and convenience consumers obtain through a PC. 3 Network
computer systems lack the hardware resources required to support Intelcompatible PC operating systems.'
Firms not currently engaged in the production of Intel-compatible PC
operating systems could begin such production and compete with Microsoft
Windows." However, firms are precluded from doing so as the result of the
"chicken & egg" problem (also called "applications barrier to entry").5s Users
are only likely to buy an operating system for which there exists a substantial
and diverse number of applications; meanwhile, new applications
are only
7
likely to be written for operating systems that are widely used.
3. Market Power
Microsoft's power in the market of Intel-compatible PC operating systems
is affected by three main factors. First, the market share of Microsoft is large
and highly stable." In each year since 1990, Microsoft has possessed over
ninety percent of the Intel-compatible PC operating systems market."
Secondly, high entry barriers guard the market.' The applications barrier to
entry results from consumers favoring operating systems with the ability to
run high numbers of applications, and software producers producing
applications for the most widely used operating systems." Finally, the
consumers of Intel-compatible PC operating systems lack realistic alternative
products. 2
4. Actions of Microsoft
Over the course of several years, Microsoft has engaged in conduct that is
evidence of monopoly power and conduct of an anticompetitive nature.' The

"
'4

55

See id. at 15-16.
See id. at 16.
See id. at 18.

"See id.
7

See id.

" See United States v. Microsoft, Corp., 84 F. Supp. 2d 9, 19 (D.D.C. 1999).
s9 See id.

60See id.
61 See id.
62 Judge Jackson also noted that even if Apple's Mac OS were to be included into the
relevant market under a broader definition, the market share of Microsoft would still be over
eighty percent. See id. at 22.
See id. at 28.
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conduct includes actions taken toward other firms and actions involving other
markets without sufficient justifications.
Netscape's Navigator web browser" and Sun Microsystems' Java both
presented a potential threat to Microsoft's barriers to entry. 65 Browsers such
as Navigator have the potential to weaken Microsoft's position because the
browser can be installed on a Windows based operating system and gain
widespread use as a complementary application." However, a browser also
has the capability to run other software applications within it, allowing
applications to run on different operating systems.6 7
Sun Microsystems presented a similar threat to Microsoft through its
development of Java Technologies." Java would ultimately enable applications written in Java to function on a variety of operating systems. 69 Netscape
and Sun entered into an agreement in 1995 providing that Java would be
included with every copy of Navigator.70 The agreement allowed Navigator
to become the vehicle by which Java reached computers with Windows
operating systems.
In response to the perceived threat, Microsoft first attempted to persuade
Netscape not to distribute Navigator as platform-level browsing software.72
Unable to procure a comprehensive response, Microsoft then attempted to
offer Netscape a "special relationship" agreement giving Netscape access to
the technical information necessary to develop Navigator on the condition that
Netscape develop mainly server-based applications rather than a more
comprehensive platform of network applications.73 Following Netscape's
refusal to enter the arrangement, Microsoft delayed or withheld the technical
needed to complete the Windows 95 compatible version
information Netscape
74
of Navigator.

"Netscape began production of the first widely popular graphical browser, Navigator in
December 1994. See United States v. Microsoft, Corp., 84 F. Supp. 2d 9, 14 (D.D.C. 1999).
' See id. at
6See id.

67 See

28.

id.

Java is a programming language in which applications are written; programs can then be
compiled into libraries and, finally, the libraries are translated and run on underlying operating
systems. See id. at 29.
68

" See id.
70

See United States v. Microsoft, Corp., 84 F. Supp. 2d 9, 29 (D.D.C. 1999).

7
"

See id. at 30.
See id. at 31-33.

74

See id. at 33.

71See id.
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Microsoft engaged in similar conduct when other potential competitors
made threats to the market.7 5 Intel Corporation began a move away from its
traditional microprocessor production into software development.76 Microsoft
pressured the original equipment manufacturers (the major customers7
dependent on Windows) into not installing the Intel NSP software on PCs. 7
Without the cooperation of the equipment manufacturers, Intel was forced to
surrender promotion of its software. 8
Apple Computer, Inc. created versions of Quicktime, a software program
capable of playing multimedia, which was compatible with both MacOS and
Windows. 79 Quicktime presented a threat to the applications barrier to entry
as a cross-platform program." Microsoft returned with a proposal similar to
the offer made to Netscape, which Apple ultimately rejected.8' In response,
Microsoft threatened further development and marketing of multimedia tools
in competition with Apple and limited the compatibility between Quicktime
and Windows. 2
IBM PC Company operates primarily as an original equipment manufacturer and is a large purchaser of Microsoft Windows. 3 However, IBM's
software division marketed OS/2 operating systems as an alternative to
Windows. 84 Microsoft refused to deal with IBM on terms similar to those
offered to other IBM competitors as long as IBM developed and marketed a
competing operating system. 5 As an alternative, Microsoft proposed a
"Frontline Partnership," which would give IBM advantageous dealings along
with Microsoft's cooperation in marketing and technical information. 6 In
return, IBM would abandon its OS/2 operating system. 7 IBM rejected the
proposal and began promoting its own software products and operating
" See id. at 34.
716See United States v. Microsoft, Corp., 84 F. Supp. 2d 9,34 (D.D.C. 1999). Intel's Native
Signal Processing (NSP) software had enhanced video and graphics performance and was being
developed for non-Microsoft operating systems. Thus, NSP presented a threat to the barriers
to entry.
" Seeid. at35.

78 See id
79 See id. at36.
8o See id.

" See id. at 36-37.

82 See United States v. Microsoft, Corp., 84 F. Supp. 2d 9,36-37 (D.D.C. 1999).
8 See id. at 38-39.
u See id.

" See id. at 39. Microsoft charged IBM higher prices, delayed or withheld license rights for
Windows 95 and denied technical and marketing support.
"See id.

87 See id.
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system.88 Microsoft retaliated by delaying IBM's license to Windows
95 with
89
an audit and refusing to provide important technical information.
In addition to pressuring potential competitors away from the development
of software that could lessen the applications barrier to entry or foster
competing operating systems, Microsoft also began developing and vigorously
promoting its own programs. 90 Wide usage of the applications promoted by
Microsoft would prevent competing applications from becoming widely used,
thus minimizing their ability to undermine the applications barrier to entry. 9'
Microsoft's major focus in this behavior was the development of Internet
Explorer as competing web browsing software. 92 In developing Internet
Explorer, Microsoft's goal was to make a browser at least as attractive to
consumers as Netscape Navigator and use other devices to induce the use of
Internet Explorer rather than Navigator.93 Despite the possible opportunity to
profit from the licensing of Explorer, Microsoft gave the browser away with
each copy of Windows. '
In order to further its own browser usage and inhibit the growth of
Netscape Navigator, Microsoft also began a campaign to limit Netscape's
access to distribution channels.95 The major distribution channels for Internet
browsers are original equipment pre-installation and Internet Access Provider
bundling.' Microsoft, knowing that these channels were the prime distribution channels, began to bundle Internet Explorer to Windows to exclude
Navigator. 97
In order for the action to be correctly regarded as a bundling arrangement,
it must first be determined that the web browser (Internet Explorer) is a
separate product from the operating system (Windows). 9 Unlike operating
systems, a web browser provides a user with specific functionalities, such as

See United States v. Microsoft, Corp., 84 F. Supp. 2d 9, 39-40 (D.D.C. 1999).
These delays caused IBM to miss two major selling seasons and cost substantial revenue.
Competitors of IBM in PC production, working in cooperation with Microsoft, saw their sales
grow rapidly. See id. at 41.
's

89

90 See id. at 43.
91 See id.
' See id.
93 See id.

" See United States v. Microsoft, Corp., 84 F.Supp. 2d 9, 44 (D.D.C. 1999).
9' See id. at 46.

96 See id. at 47.
97 See id. at 47-48.
98 This portion of Judge Penfield Jackson's findings of fact was the most essential to his
findings of wrongful conduct by Microsoft and was remanded on appeal. See Richard A.
Epstein, Phew!, WALL ST. J., June 29, 2001, at A10.
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the ability to select, retrieve and perceive resources on the World Wide Web."
These functionalities are distinct from those provided by an operating
system.'" Consumers prefer to separate their choice of web browser from
their choice of operating systems in order to obtain browsers that fit their
specific needs or even refrain from having a browser at all.'
Microsoft's bundling campaign became more extensive as the company
became more focused on ensuring that Netscape Navigator would not be a
threat.'0 2 In 1995, Microsoft began including a clause in the license agreement
with original equipment manufacturers (OEMs) preventing the modification
or removal of any part of Windows 95, including Internet Explorer.'0 3 In
1996, Microsoft increased the strength of the tie on technical levels, making
it more difficult to remove Internet Explorer from Windows 95 and complicating running Navigator on the operating system."°4 The upgrade version,
Windows 98, had its release delayed so that Internet Explorer could be more
tightly bound to it.10 5
Although regarded for a long time as the arena Microsoft was willing to
leave to Netscape, Apple computers would also eventually be foreclosed as a
browser distribution channel."° Microsoft threatened to cancel Macintosh
Office (a certainly fatal blow to Apple) unless the company began distribution
and promotion of Internet Explorer rather than Navigator.0 7 Apple reluctantly
agreed to the agreement and made Internet Explorer the default browser for its
machines."
Microsoft's overwhelming efforts to exclude Netscape and maximize usage
of Internet Explorer paid off. The use of Internet Explorer has increased
dramatically since 1996.'09 From 1996 to 1997, Internet Explorer's share of
the browser market increased from five to thirty-six percent, while Navigator's
share fell from eighty percent to fifty-five percent." 0 By keeping Netscape in

9 See United States v. Microsoft, Corp., 84 F. Supp. 2d 9,48 (D.D.C. 1999).

100See id.
101See id.

'0' See id. at 49.

See id.

See id. at 50.
' See United States v. Microsoft, Corp., 84 F. Supp. 2d 9, 51-52. Judge Jackson focused
intently on communications between Microsoft executives surrounding the need to use the
Windows base as leverage for the Internet Explorer market. See id.
'06 See id. at 94.
107 See id. at 95.
104

See id. at 97.
id. at 98.
110 See id. at 98-99.
los

109 See
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check, Microsoft was able to hold off a serious threat to its applications
barriers to entry."'
Microsoft engaged in a similar response to the threat Sun's Java programming posed to the Windows applications barrier to entry. Microsoft obtained
a licensing agreement for Sun's Java programming language that allowed
Microsoft to make certain modifications." 2 Microsoft used the agreement to
make its own Java tools and a Windows compatible environment that
preserved the difficulty in porting between operating systems."' Microsoft
then persuaded developers to use the Microsoft-implemented Java format
rather than the broader Sun-compliant version." Microsoft then bundled the5
Windows Java within the Windows operating system and Internet Explorer."l
Software vendors were given incentives to use Microsoft's Java version rather
than the Sun-compliant one."' The result of Microsoft's actions regarding
Sun was that it impeded Java's progress toward greater portability between
Windows
and other operating systems, lowering the applications barrier to
7
entry.1

5. Effects on Consumers
Microsoft has shown that its actions have resulted in positive effects for
consumers; Netscape was forced to innovate and improve Navigator at an
accelerated rate and the lack of charge for Internet Explorer decreased public
costs while familiarity with the Internet increased."' However, Microsoft's
actions also had detrimental effects on consumers. Microsoft preserved its
applications barrier to entry, resulting in protection of monopoly power." 9
Consumers were denied the right of choice in pre-installed browser applications from equipment manufacturers. 20 By increasing technical ties between

See United States v. Microsoft, Corp., 84 F. Supp. 2d 9, 103 (D.D.C. 1999).
See id. at 105. The eventual termination of this licensing agreement in the recent
settlement. See Montalbano, supra note 28.
"' See United States v. Microsoft, Corp., 84 F. Supp. 2d 9, 105 (D.D.C. 1999) (the original
motivation behind Sun's Java was the exact opposite inthat the programs were initially designed
to greatly enhance porting between operating systems, thus limiting application barriers to
"'

"'

entry).
"4 See id. at
"s Seeid. at
116 See id. at
"7 Seeid. at
u1 See id.at
"o

107.

107-08.
108.
110.

110-11.

See United States v. Microsoft, Corp., 84 F. Supp. 2d 9, 111 (D.D.C. 1999).

"0 See id.
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Windows and Internet Explorer, Microsoft increased consumer confusion and
customer service requirements. '' The campaigns against Navigator and Java
also stifled the innovation of those markets by lessening competition and
making cross-platform technology less feasible."'2 Finally, Microsoft has
established that any efforts toward innovation in the computer industry that
could potentially weaken Microsoft's barriers will be met with threats and
pressure leveraged by Microsoft's high market power.'"
IIL. HISTORY: IBM CASE
A review of a major antitrust case pursued both in Europe and the United
States likely will serve as the most accurate predictor of the result in the
Microsoft action. The United States and the European Union both brought
antitrust actions against IBM for similar conduct. The approaches to the
actions and eventual outcomes, however, were much different. Obvious
similarities exist between the actions against IBM and those currently being
litigated involving Microsoft.
A. The US. Case
In 1952, the United States launched a civil antitrust action against IBM.' 24
The suit resulted in a consent decree that was amended several times. 25 The
United States filed a second antitrust suit in 1969."26 That case alleged
27
monopolization by IBM in violation of section 2 of the Sherman Act.

In the second lawsuit, the government alleged that IBM held seventy-four
percent of the market for digital computers. 2 8 The government did not sue
based on IBM's acquisition of dominant market position; instead, the case
charged that the monopoly power in the relevant market was maintained
through anticompetitive acts. 29 The violations alleged by the U.S. govern

121See id.

See id. at 111- 12.
See id. at 112.
124 See IBM1995, 45 F.3d at 642.
125 See id.
'22

3

..
6 See United States v. Int'l Bus. Machs., Civil Action No. 69-200 (S.D.N.Y.) [hereinafter
IBM1969].
127
128

See 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1994).
See John E. Lopatka, United States v. IBM: A Monument loArrogance, 68 ANTITRUST L.J.

145, 147 (2000).

t29 The government did not necessarily believe that the power of IBM was acquired through
lawful means, but ironically decided not to pursue such a claim because proving it would take
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ment were that IBM had engaged in predatory pricing, 30 illegally bundled
hardware, software and support services (also called product tying), 3' . and
announced new products
prematurely in order to injure competition, a practice
32 33
known as "vaporware1 .''
The case moved through endless filings and discovery procedures for over
thirteen years." Six years of discovery were followed by a trial spread over
seven years; over 104,400 pages of transcript were produced. 13 Five
presidents, nine Attorneys General, and seven Antitrust Division Chiefs took
office while the case was proceeding.3 6 It is estimated that the case cost the
government $16.8 million and IBM $50 to $100 million.' The case has been
referred to as the "Antitrust Division's Vietnam.' ' 3' Finally, in 1982, the
Assistant Attorney General, William F. Baxter, filed a motion to dismiss the
case. a9 Baxter stated that his staff had conducted a review of the trial record
and proceedings and ultimately
concluded that the case was without merit and
40
should be dismissed. 1

too long. See Lewis Bernstein, BigBlue: A PersonalReaction,ANTITRUST, Winter 1988, at 40.
30 No consensus has been formed on an actual definition for predatory pricing. However,
various cases and commentators help form the general operating ideas. In MatsushitaElectric
IndustrialCo. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 585 (1986) predatory pricing was defined
as either "pricing below the level necessary to sell their products or pricing below some
appropriate measure of cost." A successful predatory pricing campaign requires that the predator
be able to absorb the market share of its rivals once prices have been cut. Despite the fact that
such conduct occurs with some level of frequency, American courts have considered the action
as something rarely attempted. See Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Co.,
113 S. Ct. 2578 (1993).
,' A tying arrangement is the sale of one product by a party on the condition that the buyer
purchases a different product. Such an arrangement can be held a violation of section 1 of the
Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1994). See Morgan Chu & Steven Kang, Antitrust Basicsfor 1P
Attorneys: PartOne, 6 No. 10 INTELL. PROP. STRATEGIST I (July 2000).
13 The practice of vaporware allows a dominant firm to sabotage its rival's products by
announcing that it is about to come out with a similar product, when the actual launch date is
months or years away. The potential existence of such a product will persuade buyers to wait
for the dominant firms product rather than switch to a new supplier. See Cassidy, supra note 9,
at 32.
' See Lopatka, supra note 128, at 147.
1a4 See id. at 145.
135See id.
136See id.
137See id.
138 Robert Bork, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX 432 (1993).
139 The motion also followed dramatic changes in the U.S. political climate.
140 In re Int'l Bus. Machs., 687 F.2d 591, 594 (2d Cir. 1982) [hereinafter IBM1982].
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The case in review is illustrative of American antitrust policy and
procedures. Early American antitrust law took a "big is bad" approach, 4 1 and
the decision to drop the case may have represented a desire to shuck that label
toward a more favorable approach with regard to dominant firms. 42 Baxter
felt that section 2 of the Sherman Act should not "be regarded as creating a
status offense."' 43 The decision to bring the case at all has been viewed as
flawed given current American antitrust values, many of which seem familiar
in light of the proceedings against Microsoft.'"
The investigation against IBM began at the urging of competitors, whose
views and allegations are usually biased by their interest in damaging their
rival. 45 Secondly, IBM teaches that allegations of bundling within the
technological industry will be difficult to prove due to efficiency
justifications. " Also, critics of the IBM litigation feel that U.S. antitrust cases
should only be brought when a remedy can be foreseen and the remedy will
be beneficial to consumers, especially when the proposed relief is structural. "'
Perhaps the most important effect the IBM case carried into U.S. antitrust
law today and onto the Microsoft litigation is the belief that the free market is
a better check on behavior than the courts, especially in highly innovative
4
markets such as the technology industry."
Quite often, such markets exhibit
a pattern where one dominant product gives way to another, giving a large
market share for a short period and leading to a loss of dominance due to
failure in innovation. 49

' The government brought a variety of cases with mixed success from 1940-1970. The
focus of many cases was on market structure and targeted large producers. See generally United
States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945) (condemning dominant
aluminum producer); American Tobacco Co. v. United States, 328 U.S. 781 (1946) (upholding
the conviction of a combination of major tobacco firms); United States v. Griffith 334 U.S. 100
(1948) (condemning activity ofdominant motion picture theater owner); United States v. United
Shoe Machinery Corp., 110 F. Supp. 295 (D.Mass. 1953), aff'dpercuriam 347 U.S. 521 (1954)
(condemning conduct of major shoe manufacturer); United States v. E.I. Du Pont De Nemours
& Co., 351 U.S. 377 (1956) (finding no liability for major producer of cellophane).
141 See Berkey Photo, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 603 F.2d 263 (2nd Cir. 1979).
4 See Lopatka, supra note 128, at 148.
'4 See Gary S. Becker & Kevin M. Murphy, Rethinking Antitrust, WALL ST. J., Feb. 26,
2001, at A22.
141See Lopatka, supra note 128, at 149.
'4 See id. at 152.
147See id. at 159.

See Richard M. Bruneli, Appropriability in Antitrust: How Much is Enough, 69
ANTITRUST L.J. 1, 27 (2001).
148

"9See Lopatka, supranote 128, at 156. Lopatka believes that American antitrust law is not
capable of distinguishing anticompetitive innovation from procompetitive innovation and thus

20011

MICROSOFT & THE

EU

B. The European Union IBM Case
The approach to the IBM case was very different on the opposite side of
the Atlantic Ocean. Initially, the United States attempted to dissuade the
European Union from even taking the case. 5 0 However, the case was
ultimately brought against IBM for violations of Article 86 (now 82) of the
Treaty of Rome involving abuse of a dominant position.'' The European
Union was able to accomplish what the Antitrust Division of the United States
could not. The case in Europe ended relatively quickly and resulted in a
settlement by which IBM agreed to grant licenses and access to technical
information. '
The European Union approach to BM avoided many of the pitfalls that
trapped the courts of the United States. European competition law is not
restricted by market definition, but instead requires only a dominant
position.' Thus, IBM's contentions of a contrived market definition would
likely have fallen on deaf ears because of IBM's obviously dominant position.
The main reason, however, for IBM's inability to succeed in European courts
comes as a result of those courts' focus on the right of competition, especially
for small to medium size firms.'5 ' IBM's alleged pricing practices and
bundling procedures had erected obvious entry barriers. 55 Under U.S.
antitrust law, such practices can be offset by market efficiency justifications,

should refrain from intervening. In his words, "[t]he costs of antitrust are minimized when
claims that should fail are never brought." Id. at 154. Such an approach is in contrast to the
much less permissive approach in Europe.
SOSee ELEANORM. Fox& LAWRENCE A. SULLIVAN, CASES AND MATERIALS ON ANTITRUST

237-44 (1989).
"' See Int'l Bus. Machs., Corp. v. Commission, 1981 E.C.R. 1857.
m See James B. Kobak, Jr., Running the Gauntlet: Antitrust and Intellectual Property
Pitfallson The Two Sides ofthe Atlantic, 64 ANTITRUST L.J. 341, 347 (1996).
'5 See Mercer H. Harz, Dominance and Duty in the European Union: A Look Through
Microsoft Windows at the Essential FacilitiesDoctrine, 11 EMORY INT'L L. REV. 189, 198

(1997). Harz's article is an attempt to examine the essential facility doctrine of the European
Union using the alleged anticompetitive behavior of Microsoft for illustration. Harz's article,
published in 1997, lacked both the specific findings of fact regarding Microsoft and any serious
action having been taken by the European Union. Using this information, this article can provide
comparisons through a prediction of the outcome of the lawsuit filed in the European Union.
The Harz article, while informative, lacks information from current events. Thus, the positions
advanced by Harz when cited must be understood to have been made in 1997, prior to the ruling
by the United States District Court and before the current substantive action was undertaken by
the European Union.
"u See id. at 196.
lss See id.

GA. J. INT'L & CoMP. L.

[Vol. 30:101

especially due to the highly innovative nature of the technology industry." 6
European Union law, however, places less emphasis on market efficiency.'57
For these reasons, the European Union had little difficulty in condemning the
actions of IBM.
The European Union also was able to proceed against IBM with a clear
idea of redress. Rather than pursue the structural relief sought by the
American courts, the European Union, having found violations, imposes a
major fine. 5 s Although remedies in the United States might initially seem59
more severe, the penalties are also in issue and thus, the subject of litigation.
The fact that the European remedy is clear causes less litigation over the issue
and thus, the remedy can be imposed with greater frequency.' 6° More
importantly however, the European Union (through the European Commission) acts in a regulatory or protective manner. 161 This manner is unlike the
U.S. Justice Department, which can be viewed as a retroactive policing
agency.'62 In the case of IBM, the threat of action was likely enough to elicit
a settlement from IBM providing access to its information.' 63 Whereas, in
pursuing structural relief the U.S. Antitrust Division forced IBM to fight to
remain whole.'
IV. EUROPEAN UNION ANTITRUST SYSTEM

The antitrust enforcement and regulatory systems of the European Union
differ greatly from those in the United States. The unique framework of the
system provides for different, yet often consistent results. An analysis of
European Union statutory provisions covering antitrust and the judicial as well
regulatory systems provides the framework for court decisions, including the
case against Microsoft. Finally, a review of European Union public policy

,"' See Lopatka, supra note 128, at 162.
'" See Harz, supra note 153, at 197.
IS See Jebsen & Stevens, supra note 38, at 447.
159See id.

160See id.
161See id.
162See id.

See Kobak, supra note 152, at 347.
'"See Jebsen & Stevens, supra note 38, at 448. Jebsen and Stevens note that American
businessmen and their legal advisors are willing to deal with the American antitrust regulators
on an adversarial or confrontational basis, but that in dealing with the regulatory bodies of the
European Union avoidance of confrontation is almost always essential, given the enormous
discretionary powers of the regulators. See id.
"
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goals and emphases regarding antitrust regulation will help foster an accurate
prediction of Microsoft's future abroad.
A. Structure
With regard to antitrust regulation, the European Union is divided into
three relevant institutions: the European Commission, the European Court of
Justice and the Court of First Instance. All play an active role in European
Union competition law.'65 The EC Treaty"6 established the European
Commission as the executive branch of the Community.'6 7 The Commission
proposes legislation and monitors compliance with legislation and treaties. 6 '
As the executive, it has control over mergers, cartels, abuses of dominant
positions and state measures interfering with competition.' 69 The Commission
also has the authority to institute formal procedures such as inspections, filing
of objections, oral hearings and publications of final decisions. 70
The European Community Treaty also established the European Court of
Justice (ECJ). 7 ' The court consists of fifteen judges with jurisdiction over
cases regarding failure to fulfill a Treaty obligation, annulments and legality
of acts of Community institutions, failures to act, actions for damages, staff
cases and interpretations of Community law.' The court is also the appellate
court for the Court of First Instance. 73 The Court of First Instance (CFI) was
created by the European Commission to ease the caseload burden on the
ECJ.' 74 The CFI consists of fifteen members who focus on actions that75require
a more detailed examination of facts, or complex factual situations.

'65See Scott M. Kareff, Tetra Pak InternationalSA v. Commission (Tetra Pak If): The
EuropeanApproach to Monopoly Leveraging,28 LAW & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 549, 564 (1997).
'6 See EC TREATY arts. 164-88.
7 See Kareff, supra note 165, at 564.
'" See id.
' See id.
170 See id.
171 See EC TREATY arts. (old) 164-88.

See Kareff, supranote 165, at 565-66.
See id. at 566.
"7 See Council Decision 88/591, 1988 O.J. (L 319) 1; 88/591, 989 O.J. (L-241) 4.
'75 See Kareff, supra note 165, at 567.
'7

'73
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B. Statutes
Antitrust law in the European Union is derived mainly from the treaty of
Rome, articles 81 (ex 85) and 82 (ex 86).176 The focus of the case against
Microsoft is in regard to violations of article 82 (ex 86), which focuses on
unilateral acts of dominant firms.1'7 Article 82 (ex 86) provides:
Any abuse by one or more undertakings of a dominant
position within the common market or in a substantial part of
it shall be prohibited as incompatible with the common
market in so far as it may affect trade between Member
States. Such abuse may, in particular, consist in (a) directly
or indirectly imposing unfair purchase or selling prices or
other unfair trading conditions; (b) limiting production,
markets or technical development to the prejudice of consumers; (c) applying dissimilar conditions to equivalent transactions with other trading parties, thereby placing them at a
competitive disadvantage; (d) making the conclusion of
contracts subject to acceptance by the other parties of
supplementary obligations which, by their nature or according
to commercial usage, have no connection with the subject.of
such contracts.'78
It is first important to note that the article itself is a portion of a treaty and
that antitrust in the European Union is governed by treaty law, not the
legislative or parliamentary action of a national government. 79 The treaty is

"7

See EC TREATY arts. 81-82 (ex 85-86). Article 81 (ex 85) prohibits all agreements

between undertakings, decisions by associations of undertakings and concerted practices that

may affect trade between member states. The article continues by non-exhaustively listing
prohibited conduct such as (1) fixing prices, (2) limiting or controlling market supply, (3)

sharing markets or sources of supply, (4) applying dissimilar conditions to similar transactions,
and (5) making contracts subject to acceptance of supplementary obligations not connected to
the transaction. Article 81 (ex 85) reaches formal and informal agreements and only a potential
effect on trade between member states need be shown. The alleged conduct of Microsoft would
not fall under Article 81 (ex 85) since the actions were unilateral. For continued analysis on
Article 81 (ex 85) see VALENTINE KORAH, AN INTRODUCTORY GUIDE To EC COMPETITION LAW
AND PRACTICE 41-75 (6th ed. 1997).
'"SeeKORAH, supra note 176, at 3.
'' See EC TREATY art. 82 (ex 86).
'
See Kobak, supra note 152, at 352.
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a political instrument built on political considerations. 0 The European Union
itself was formed with the goal of a unified common market. '' The Treaty of
Rome set forth policy goals to further this goal.' The fundamental aspects
of the treaty are the promotion of agreements furthering the integration or
strengthening of the Community.'83 As a means to the end, the Treaty restricts
arrangements that divide the Community or maintain economic boundaries on
national lines." The full breadth of article 82 (ex 86) of the Treaty can be
understood by an examination of the elements of the provision.
1. GeographicMarket
First is the geographic market element. The Treaty prohibits abuse "within
the common market or in a substantial part of it."'8 5 The common market has
been held in very general regard, and typically the accusing party finds little
difficulty in meeting this element.8 6 The "market" is usually found to be "a
clearly defined geographic area" where generally the competitive conditions
are similar enough for all traders so as to evaluate the economic power
concerned. 8 7 However, it is possible to draw lines not on geographic terms
but based on other factors dividing customers.'
The geographic market, in
practice, has been defined narrowly.' 9 The ECJ, in United Brands Co. v.

180See id.
"
282

See Waller, supra note 5, at 55.

See id. at 56.

1 See id.
14 See id.

S

EC TREATY art. 82 (ex 86).

'4 See Jebsen & Stevens, supra note 38, at 463.

187 See

id. at 464 (citing Case 27/76, United Brands Co. v. Commission, 1 C.M.L.R. 1429

(1978)).
'8s See KORAH, supra note 176, at 94 (citing Pigs & Bacon Comm'n v. McCarren (177/78)
[1979] E.C.R. 2161 (1979)).
" See Thomas E. Kauper, The Problem ofMarket Definition Under EC Competition Law,
20 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 1682, 1714 (1997). The terms "narrow" and "broad" can become
especially confusing with regard to antitrust enforcement. In general practice, a defendant seeks
to narrow the application of the law; however, with regard to antitrust cases the defendant will
seek broad definitions in virtually every element, while the plaintiff will attempt to advance
narrow definitions. See generally Fox & SULLIVAN, supra note 150. The reasoning becomes
incredibly important. The more narrowly the plaintiff is able to define various elements such
as product or geography, the greater share of such market can be attributed to the defendant, thus
increasing the defendant's market share/power. See id. As will be discussed, the degree of
breadth the court accepts is often determinative with regard to the case. See id.

GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L.

[Vol. 30: 101

Commission,'"' found the relevant geographic market not to be all of the
European common market, but only the Benelux 9' countries. In an even
narrower interpretation, the court in Michelin N.V. v. Commission,' 92 rejected
the arguments that the geographic market should be worldwide or at least
community-wide.,9 Instead the court held that although Michelin operated on
a worldwide basis, the operations of its subsidiary in the Netherlands could
themselves form a relevant geographic market."9 The court continued the
willingness to narrow the geographic market as far as national lines in Irish
Sugarplcv. Commission." The court limited the relevant geographic market
to the country of Ireland.' 96
2. ProductMarket
As part of the geographic market element, the proper product market must
be shown. Adhering to the strict regulatory position regarding the common
market, the product market has also been defined narrowly. 197 In order to find
a product within the common market, the statute has been interpreted to
include products with a limited interchangeability'" and those for which there
exists a cross-elasticity' 99 of demand or demand substitutability.2' In United

'" See Case 2776, United Brands Co. v. Commission, 1978 E.C.R. 207, [1978] 1 C.M.L.R.
429 (1978) [hereinafter United Brands]. See also Case T-30/89 Hilti AG v. E.C. Commission,
1991 ECR 11-1439, [1992] 4 C.M.L.R. 16 (Ct. of First Instance 1992) [hereinafter Hilti AG].
Cf. Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Services, Inc., 504 U.S. 451 (1992) (providing
geographic definitions in U.S. antitrust law).
'.' The Benelux countries include Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg.
"9See Case 322/81, Michelin N.V. v. Commission, 1983 E.C.R. 3461, [1985] 1 C.M.L.R.
282 (1985) [hereinafter Michelin N.V.].
193See id. at 302.

1' See id.

See Case T-228/97, Irish Sugar plc v. Commission, 1999 E.C.R. 11-2969 (1999)
[hereinafter Irish Sugar]. But see Case T-65/96, Kish Glass & Co. Ltd. v. Commission, 2000
E.C.R. 0 (refusing to limit market to Ireland due to community-wide trade) [hereinafter Kish
Glass].
'" See Irish Sugar, 1999 E.C.R. 11-2969 (1999).
117 See Kauper, supra note 189, at 1689-90.
'" Interchangeability has been divided into functional and practical subdivisions. See Jebsen
& Stevens, supra note 38, at 468-72. Functional interchangeability occurs when either of the
two products at issue can perform the same function. See id. Practical (also reasonable)
interchangeability exists when consumers will be willing to switch between the two products
should price differences arise. See id. For a case turning on interchangeability distinctions see
United States v. E.I. Du Pont De Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377 (1956).
'9 Cross elasticity of demand or demand substitutability is measured by the percent shift in
quantity demanded caused by a one percent change in price. Demand is elastic ifa one percent
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Brands v. Commission, the court adopted a relevant product market consisting
only of bananas rather than the broader overall fruit market.2"' The Court has
continued to define product markets narrowly in recent cases. In Tetra Pak
InternationalSA v. Commission,2'2 the court viewed the market for cartons not
as a single market, but as two separate markets: aseptic and non-aseptic.2 3
The narrow market proved critical in Tetra PakII for a finding of a dominant
position. 2
3. Dominant Position
The next element that must be shown is that the accused is in a dominant
position.2 5 The European Union determines dominance with regard to article
82 (ex 86) as the power "to prevent effective competition and the power to
behave independently of competitors and customers to an appreciable
extent. '' 206 This power is determined mostly by finding the market share of the
alleged offender with regard to the relevant product(s). 2 7 The European
Union has been very liberal in finding a market share adequate to constitute
dominance. 28 Even market shares that are neither facially large nor measured
over time have been held to suffice. ' 09 Undertakings with a market share of
less than fifty percent have constituted dominance. 2 0 The Commission has
even issued a report indicating that market shares of twenty to forty percent
cannot be ruled out with regard to dominance.2 In cases where the market

price rise will cause more than a one percent demand shift. Two products are cross elastic if the
one percent shift moves between them. See Fox & SULLIVAN, supra note 150, at 139.
2woSee Jebsen & Stevens, supra note 38, at 470; Cf United States v. E.I. Du Pont De
Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377 (1956).
20'See United Brands Co. v. Commission, 1978 E.C.R. 207, [1978] 1 C.M.L.R. 429, 439
(1978). The court literally ruled that it is improper to compare apples and oranges (with
bananas). See also Hilti AG Commission, 1991 E.C.R. 11-1439, [1992] 4 C.M.L.R. 16 (1991)
(similarly narrow market definition).
m See Case C-333/94, Tetra Pak International SA v. Commission, 1996 E.C.R. 1-5951,
[1997] 4 C.M.L.R. 662 (1996) [hereinafter Tetra Pak II].
203 See id.

204 See id. at 682.
205See Waller, supra note 5, at 68.
0

Jebsen & Stevens, supra note 38, at 480.

" See id. at 481.

2

See id.
"9 See id.
210 See id.
211Commission of European Communities, Tenth Report on Competition Policy (1981).

Compare the United States position regarding market power where ninety percent is enough to

124-
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share is lower, if high barriers to entry guard the market share, a dominant
position may be inferred.2 12
The UnitedBrandscourt found a market share of approximately forty-five
percent of the relevant banana market to be sufficient enough to constitute a
dominant position even though strong competitors existed.213 After drawing
a distinction between aseptic and non-aseptic cartons, the Tetra Pak I court
found a dominant position based on market shares of ninety to ninety-five
percent and fifty to fifty-five percent in each of the carton markets.2" 4 Finally,
in Michelin, the court found Michelin to be in a dominant position. 2 5
Although Goodyear (a major competitor) held more market share worldwide,
the court's narrow geographic market moved Michelin into a position as the
dominant firm in the Dutch market.21 6
4. Abuse of Dominant Position
The final element of article 82 (ex 86) is the most important. It prohibits
any "abuse" of a dominant position."' Abuse could include any conduct
injurious to competitors or consumers, regardless ofwhether or not the actions
would be lawful if done by a firm without a dominant position. 2' s The
European Union has dictated that those firms with a dominant position owe a
"special responsibility" to competitors and to consumers. 2 9 Acts by a firm as
simple as reaping the competitive rewards of its success could possibly give
rise to violations" under this standard of objectivity since intent is

constitute a monopoly, sixty percent is doubtful and thirty-three percent is certainly not. See
United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416, 424 (2d Cir. 1945).
212 See KORAH, supra note 176, at 89.
213See United Brands, [1978] 1C.M.L.R. at 458.
14 See Tetra Pak 11, [1997] 4 C.M.L.R. at 682.
211 See Michelin N.V., [1985] 1 C.M.L.R. at 288-89.
216 See id.
217 See EC TREATY art. 82 (ex 86).
21 See Waller, supra note 5, at 71.
2'9 See Jebsen & Stevens, supra note 38, at 488.
2

The stance of the United States is much different. Ithas been held that a large firm does

not violate section two of the Sherman Act simply by reaping the competitive rewards
attributable to its efficient size. See Berkey Photo, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 603 F.2d 263 (2d
Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1093 (1980). See also United Shoe Machinery Corp., I10 F.
Supp. 295 (D.Mass. 1953), aff'dper curiam, 347 U.S. 521 (1954) (indicating that U.S. courts
will not condemn acts or acquisition of monopoly power related to "superior skill, superior
products, natural advantages, economic or technological efficiency, low margins of profit...
or licenses conferred by, and used within, the limits of law"). Id. at 342.
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irrelevant.Y' Article 82 (ex 86) includes several particular practices through
which such abuses may be found.m The abuses need not be confined to or
occur in the market in which the dominant position is held.'
a. Pricing
The first of these abuses relates to pricing."' The European Union has
deemed the practice of predatory pricing illegal when coupled with an abusive
intent. 22' In Tetra PakII, the court found a predatory pricing campaign to have
been both rational and successful.226 Unlike American courts, the court did not
set forth a burden of proof that the predatory pricing campaign had a
dangerous likelihood of success.2 7 Practices involving pricing at different

levels between the country members are also in violation of article 82 (ex
8 6 ).22

8

Among the conduct alleged in United Brands was the practice of

charging distributors within different member states considerably different
prices. 229 The court found the conduct to be abusive as discriminatory
pricing. 3"

" See Jebsen & Stevens, supra note 38, at 489.
"2 See EC TREATY art. 82 (ex 86).
22 See Tetra Pak II, [1997] 4 C.M.L.R. at 694. The Tetra Pak IIcase summarized previous
case law into five categories regarding abuse under of article 82 (ex 86): (1) the dominant
position and the abuse are confined to the same market; (2) the abuse takes place on the
dominated market but its effects are felt on another market on which the undertaking does not
hold adominant position; (3) the abuse is committed on amarket on which the undertaking does
not hold a dominant position in order to strengthen its position on the dominated market; (4) the
abuse takes place on a market separate from, but related to and connected with, the market
dominated by the undertaking (Tetra IIcase); and (5) the dominant position and the abuse are
on different and unrelated markets. Following the Tetra holding, the scope of Article 82 (ex 86)
can only fail to reach the fifth category. See id. at 694.
24See EC TREATY, art. 82(a) (ex 86(a)).
2' See Waller, supra note 5, at 70 (noting that pricing below cost is prohibited as well as any
pricing that is deemed discriminatory or unfair discounting).
n6 See Tetra Pak II, [1997] 4 C.M.L.R. at 680.
2 See id. at 706. Cf Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Co., 113 S.Ct.
2578 (1993) (a predatory pricing claim requires both pricing below a measure of cost and
likelihood that short-term losses will be recouped). See also Matsushita Electric Industrial Co.
v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574 (1986) (stating that "predatory pricing schemes are rarely
tried and even more rarely successful."). Id. at 589.
228

See EC TREATY art. 82(a) (ex 86(a)).

-9See United Brands, [1978] 1 C.M.L.R. at 435.

230 See id.
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b. Restrictionson Production or Market Development
The second practice provided as action of illegal abuse is with regard to
limits on production or market development."I The provision largely makes
output restrictions or practices to stunt innovation illegal. 2 The United
Brands case also involved requirements that distributors not be allowed to
resell bananas while the products were still green.u3 The court found this
conduct constituted a limit on production or output regulation that amounted
to abuse of a dominant position.'
c. Discrimination
The third abusive practice governing differential dealings set forth in the
latter provisions of the article has been interpreted broadly. The clause has
been held to require that in situations where differential pricing exists, the firm
must be able to put forth an objective justification for the difference in prices
or conditions governing the sale."s In this context, refusals to supply have
been condemned.' Since the European Union places the "special responsibility" on dominant firms to deal with competitors and consumers, any refusal
will require an objective justification. 7 The justification becomes even more
important when it is found that the dominant firm controls an "essential
facility."2 8 When in control of an essential facility the justifications must be
substantial in order to overcome the larger societal concerns of the community., 9 The United Brands dealings also involved different pricing levels
between various distributors and a refusal to supply a Danish firm with
bananas. 2'
The court found both actions to be abuses of a dominant

2,See EC TREATY art. 82(b) (ex 86(b)).
id.
,3See United Brands, [1978] 1C.M.L.R. at 435.
2M See id.
2" See Jebsen & Stevens, supra note 38, at 497.
236 See KORAH, supra note 176, at 103.
232See

" See Stephen McShea, The "Dominant Position" Doctrine and the European Union's

Response to the British Airways/American AirlinesAlliance, 23 B.C. INT'L& COMP. L. REv. 71,
79. Cf Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585,602 (1985) (stating
the American principle that, absent monopolistic intent, a private businessman may deal freely
with whomever he chooses).
2's
See generally Harz,supra note 153 (for an extensive look at essential facilities doctrine).
"9See id. at 223.
m See United Brands, [1978] 1C.M.L.R. at 435.
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position.24 Similarly, in Irish Sugar, the firm's attempt to protect the "home"
market by offering border rebates and selective low pricing was characterized

as abuse of a dominant position.2"2
d. Tying

The final provision of article 82 (ex 86) particularly condemns tying
arrangements. 24 3 Early European interpretations treated tying arrangements
very strictly. 2" Many cases held tying arrangements to be per se illegal."4 In
Tetra Pak II, the court found the requirement that only Tetra cartons be used
on Tetra filling machines had the effect of making a consumer totally
dependant on Tetra. 2" Given Tetra's dominant market position in the carton

market, the tie constituted an abuse in violation of the statute.247 The court

also listed several factors for consideration as to whether two markets are
sufficiently linked so as to find a tying arrangement. ' Modem trends in
European Union law tend to allow for a balancing ofpros and cons with regard
to tying arrangements in intellectual property settings.24 9
C. Public Policy
The decisions of the courts of the European Union are also highly reflective
of and influenced by the social values of the community as a whole. U.S.

antitrust enforcement is often coined as a system preserving "competition, not
competitors"; 5 ° however, as previously indicated, the focus of the European
Union enforcement is not on efficiency."' The public goals of the enforce2A See id.
242

See Irish Sugar v. Commission, 1999 E.C.R. 11-2969 (1999) M105-108.
EC TREATY, art. 82(d) (ex 86(d)).

243 See

244See Biggers, supra note 35, at 263.

See, e.g., Case T-30/89, Hilti AG v. Comm'n, 1991 E.C.R. 11-1439, [1992] 4 C.M.L.R.
16 (Ct. of First Instance 1992) (tying of nail guns to nail cartridges and nails).
24 See Tetra Pak II, [1997] 4 C.M.L.R. at 703.
247 See id. at 704.
24 See id. at 677. The factors listed are: the supply and demand structure of the markets, the
characteristics of the products, the use by the dominant undertaking of its power on the
dominated market in order to penetrate the linked market, the market share of the dominant
undertaking on the non-dominated market, and the degree of control of the dominated market
by the dominant undertaking. See id.
249 See Biggers, supra note 35, at 263 (noting that this approach is more in line with the U.S.
approach to tying).
' Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 320 (1962).
245

25 See Kareff,supra note 165, at 554.
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ment system are to preserve and protect individual traders, marketplace
fairness, equality and opportunity for all, and the interests of workers, users
and consumers. " 2 An additional dominant element in European Union
antitrust law is the prohibition of activity that hinders the free flow of goods
throughout the community.25'
The overall aims are established in the treaties. The competition policy
seeks to establish a common market, approximate economic policies, promote
harmonious growth, raise living standards and bring the Member States closer
together.254 These public policy goals must be viewed in the extraordinarily
broad context in which they are to be achieved. The courts must embrace
these diverse objectives while balancing policies of different nations led by
different forms of government.2 " In the recently published "White Paper on
Modernisation of the Rules Implementing Articles 81 and 82 of the EC
Treaty,",25 the commission considered the notion of adopting a "rule of
reason 257 approach to antitrust similar to that in the United States. In
response, the Commission noted that pro-and anticompetitive effects are
already considered to a limited extent and the effect of formally incorporating
a rule of reason would cast aside the articles and divert them from their
purpose."' Overall, the courts' decisions, unfettered by constraints of case
precedents,
have moved across the spectrum trying to further the policy
goals.259

252
253

Id.
See REIN

WESSELING, THE MODERNIZATION OF

EC ANTITRUST LAW 87 (2000).

2 See Jebsen & Stevens, supra note 38, at 450.
," See id.at 449.
26 See Opinion of the Economic and Social Committee on the 'White Paper on modernization of the rules implementing Articles 81 and 82 of the EC Treaty-Commission Programme
No 99/207,' 2000 O.J. (C 51/55) [hereinafter White Paper].
"' Generally, antitrust violations in the United States are considered to be per se infringements (unlawful regardless of their effect on competition) or subject to a rule of reason (typically
only horizontal or agreement cases are evaluated under a rule of reason). Under the rule of
reason analysis, the court will consider (either in a quick look or fuller analysis) the procompetitive justifications, the rule of reason analysis then essentially balances the pro- and anticompetitive effects of the conduct. See generally Fox & SULLIVAN, supra note 150 (overview
of per se vs. rule of reason analysis). See Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. I (1911)
(per se analysis); Bd. of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231 (1918) (rule of reason); Broadcast
Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc. 441 U.S. 1 (1979) (rule of reason); Nat'l
Collegiate Athletic Ass'n v. Bd. of Regents of Oklahoma, 468 U.S. 85 (1984) (rule of reason).
258 See WESSELING, supra note 253, at 102.
2" See Jebsen & Stevens supra note 38, at 450. Jebsen and Stevens note that to an American
such a system may seem initially unworkable, but when viewed from the perspective of a
European skeptic, the American system proves overly simplistic. Rather than the American

2001]

MICROSOFT & THE EU
V. ANALYSIS

A. US. Findings UnderEuropean Union Law
The facts of the Microsoft case, when placed in the framework of the.
European Union, would likely lead to conclusions that Microsoft has acted in
abuse of a dominant position and in violation of the Treaty of Rome. When
applied to the U.S. findings of fact regarding relevant market, market power,
conduct and consumer effects, previous European Union case law, statutes and
policy goals all point to conclusions condemning Microsoft. Furthermore, the
structure of the European system makes it unlikely that Microsoft will be able
or will desire to lengthen the legal battle through an appeals process.
Finally, the IBM case provides a historical example of a strikingly similar
case, proceeding along similar lines and bolstering the notion that much like
IBM, Microsoft will be either unwilling or unable to fight the European
Commission.
1. GeographicMarket
The court must first find that the actions of Microsoft have occurred within
the common market or a significant part of it.26° This element should not be
difficult for the court to meet given Microsoft's dominant presence within
Europe. Even under a community-wide market finding, Microsoft has resale
partners in virtually every member country and technology partners in all
European Countries.2 6 ' Additionally, the consumers in the European Union
using Microsoft Windows and other products are estimated in the millions.262
Clearly, the court will have little trouble concluding that actions undertaken
by Microsoft had effects on the European common market. The court may,
however, choose to narrow the geographic market definition to further
increase Microsoft's dominant position. Michelin Corp., much like Microsoft,
held a global and community-wide position; however, the court was willing

simplistic approach that has dominated the century in a variety of areas (drugs, Vietnam, crime,
and Haiti), the Europeans prefer to approach complex problems with complex solutions. See id.
260 See EC TREATY art. 82 (ex 86).
261See Microsoft Partners in Europe, available at http://www.microsoft.com/
freedomtoinnovate/fin._europe.partners.htm (visited Dec. 22, 2000). Totals include 251,504
Resale Partners and 6,891 Technology Partners. Technology Partners include PC manufacturers,
software manufacturers, and Microsoft Certified Solutions Providers.
m See id.
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to limit its defined area along national lines.23 A finding of such a position
with regard to Microsoft would strengthen the case of the Commission further
by bolstering the dominant position.
2. ProductMarket

The relevant market in the European Union has often been defined
narrowly in keeping with strict regulation ofthe common market.2" The U.S.
findings of fact limited the relevant product market to Intel-compatible PC
operating systems and excluded non-Intel-compatible PC operating systems
as well as other non-computer devices.260 The finding by the United States
district court narrowed the product market dramatically. It is also likely that
the European courts will find the market at least as equally narrow given the
2"
policies of the European Union evidenced in the holding of UnitedBrands.
The holding in UnitedBrandsnarrowed the relevant product market based on
the lack of interchangeability between bananas and other fruits. 7 Viewing
other relevant products in the Microsoft case from a threshold of
interchangeability, it becomes clear that the narrow definition would be the
likely result. Servers are deemed non-interchangeable due to higher prices and
differing power requirements without the ability to support a broad scope of
applications. 268 Network systems and other devices (television, telephone and
game consoles) also are non-interchangeable because they lack the applications ability and convenience of an Intel-compatible PC operating system.269
The product market at issue in Microsoft is not likely to be viewed as
dissimilar to Tetra Pak II with regard to leveraging. The server market in
which portions of Microsoft's abuses were alleged to have been committed
would not be considered as a portion of the product market definition. The
rejection of servers as part of the product market greatly strengthens the
Commission's case since Microsoft arguably does not possess a dominant
server position.

" See Michelin N.V., [1985] 1 C.M.L.R. at 282.
See United Brands, [1978] 1 C.M.L.R. at 429.
See United States v. Microsoft, Corp., 84 F. Supp. 2d 9, 14-18 (D.D.C. 1999).
See United Brands, [1978] 1 C.M.L.R. at 429.

26
265

27 See id. at 439.
26 See United States v. Microsoft, Corp., 84 F. Supp. 2d 9, 14 (D.D.C. 1999).
29 See id. at 15-16.
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3. Dominant Position
Having found a definition of product market at least as narrow as the U.S.
court, the European courts must find that the firm holds a dominant position,
which is largely determined by market share and market power."' In keeping
with policies of preserving the common market the courts have been liberal in
" ' Microsoft's share with regard to operating
finding adequate market shares.27
systems markets has grown incredibly rapidly. In 1999, the desktop market
for Windows operating systems was approximately ninety percent. 72
Microsoft also controls an estimated thirty-seven percent of the server
operating systems market.2" 3 Since a portion of the commission's investigation involves a leveraging complaint by Sun Microsystems, a competitor in the
server market, both market shares will prove highly relevant to European
274
courts, even though a dominant position in the server market is not required.
As indicated in Michelin, the courts can determine market power by a
corporation's freedom of action regarding competitors and the ability to affect
competition.275 The European courts could further establish market power
when viewing the entry barriers protecting Microsoft's market share. The
applications barrier to entry largely gives Microsoft the ability to leverage its
way into other markets and set and maintain anticompetitive prices.27 6 When
viewed in conjunction with high market shares, the European courts will likely
be able to find that Microsoft is in possession of a dominant position. The
importance of the applications barrier to entry in preserving market power can
be further inferred by the variety of actions undertaken by Microsoft to
preserve it.

270 See KORAH, supra note 176, at 77-95.
271See Jebsen & Stevens, supra note 38, at 481.

Because of the strict view regarding market
power, Microsoft's arguments on the relevant market may be immaterial. It is quite likely that
even if all PC operating systems were included in the relevant market, Microsoft's overall share
would not fall below twenty to forty percent, which the Commission has indicated cannot be
ruled out with regard to dominance. See Commission of European Communities, supranote
211.
' See Microsoft Replies to Licensing Accusations, WORLD REP., Nov. 27, 2000.
273 See id.
274

See Dominance, supra note 1.

"' See Michelin N.V., [1985] 1 C.M.L.R. at 288-90.
276

See United States v. Microsoft, Corp., 84 F. Supp. 2d 9, 19 (D.D.C. 1999).
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4. Abuse of Dominant Position
The European courts should also be able to readily find conduct of
Microsoft that constitutes an abuse of the dominant position given that the
European Community requires a special responsibility of dominant entities
toward competitors.2 77 The actions of Microsoft can be placed into several of
the specified abuses outlined in article 82 (ex 86) of the treaty itself.27
a. Pricing
The abuses under article 82(a) (ex 86(a)) involve pricing and predatory
pricing.2 79 Microsoft's actions surrounding the distribution of Internet
Explorer are likely to be found as such an abuse. Internet Explorer presented
Microsoft with a profitable opportunity.2l
Microsoft, however, chose to
forego profits in order to increase the market share of Internet Explorer at
Netscape Navigator's expense. 28 ' The European Union courts can regard this
action as predatory. 2
b. Limits on Productionor Market Development
Article 82(b) (ex 86(b)) prohibits abuses involving limits on production or
market development.f 3 Since the provision covers restricting innovation, this
is the provision Microsoft will likely have violated on numerous occasions.
By limiting the compatibility between Windows and Navigator and preserving
the applications barrier to entry,' Microsoft stifled innovation in the browser
market. When presented with threats to competition from original equipment
manufacturers like Intel and IBM, Microsoft withheld technical information,
causing those producersto abandon their expansion into competing products
or delay their release. 2 5 The clear effect of such activity was to limit
production and innovation within the market.

See
See
27 See
230 See
27

278

Mcshea, supra note 237, at 79.

EC TREATY art. 82(a)-(d) (ex 86(a)-(d)).
EC TREATY art. 82(a) (ex 86(a)).
United States v. Microsoft, Corp., 84 F. Supp. 2d 9, 33 (D.D.C. 1999).

281See id.
2U

See Tetra Pak II, [1997] 4 C.M.L.R. 662.

283 See EC TREATY art. 82(b) (ex 86(b)).

u4 See U.S. v. Microsoft, 84 F. Supp. 2d 9 (D.D.C. 1999) M 90-91.
s See id. at 34-35, 3 8-39.
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Finally, Microsoft prohibited other innovations in the market in order to
preserve its applications barrier to entry. Sun's Java programming language
and Apple Quicktime both represented cross-platform threats. With regard to
Sun, Microsoft persuaded developers not to develop Sun-compliant
programs. 2 6 The result impeded Java's progress in developing portability
between Windows and other operating systems.",
Although not discussed in the current U.S. case, a portion of the European
Union case involves allegations by Sun that Microsoft has improperly
leveraged itself into the server market.2 By using its dominant position to
increase its share of another market, Microsoft has limited the growth of Sun
and others in that server market. Such actions will also be found to constitute
an abuse of a dominant position. The actions toward Apple and Quicktime
were similar. Microsoft developed its own multimedia program and limited
the compatibility between Quicktime and Windows.28 9 Microsoft's conduct
resulted in stunted market innovation and limited production. The abuses by
Microsoft are analogous to the abuses found in UnitedBrands2 ° with regard
to the post sale requirements on distributors.
c. Discrimination
The third provision of article 82 (ex 86) categorizes price discrimination
as an abusive undertaking. 29' Again, a variety of actions by Microsoft are
likely to fall under the scope of this provision. Microsoft's withholding of
information from Netscape following the rejection of its "special relationship"
proposal can be considered a refusal to deal. 292 Microsoft similarly withheld
technical information or refused to grant favorable dealing terms to IBM 293 and
Apple. 29 The practice of charging different prices based on compliance in
competitive markets is an example of discriminatory pricing and is likely to
face condemnation by European courts. The situation is analogous to United
Brands, where the court found the practice of charging different price levels

286See id. at
287

107.

See id. at 110.

See Dominance, supra note I.
See United States v. Microsoft, Corp., 84 F. Supp. 2d 9, 36-37 (D.D.C. 1999).
2" See United Brands, [1978] 1 C.M.L.R. at 435.
291See EC TREATY art. 82(c) (ex 86(c)).
292 See United States v. Microsoft, Corp., 84 F. Supp. 2d 9, 33 (D.D.C. 1999).
2U

239

293See id. at 39.
294 See id. at 36-37.
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to different distributors to constitute an abuse of a dominant position.!" The
court also condemned discriminatory pricing similar to that of Microsoft in
Irish Sugar.2'
d. Tying
The final provision involving abuse covers tying arrangements. 297 The
major focus of the tying claim involves the bundling of Internet Explorer to
the operating system. Given that Explorer and Windows have been found to
be separate products,29 the court can make a determination regarding the
existence of a tie or leverage into another market. The court in Tetra Pak II
listed the factors for determining whether markets are linked. 299 First, the

structure of the markets is such that demand for operating systems and
browsers are similar although not interchangeable. 3" Secondly, Microsoft has
a high market share in the dominant operating system market °' and a large
and increasing share of the browser market.? 2 Finally, the characteristics of

the products are such that they can be linked together, as evidenced by
Microsoft's bundling arrangement. Under this analysis, the conduct of
bundling Internet Explorer to Windows constitutes an unlawful tie and thus an
abuse of a dominant position.
5. Tetra Pak I Categories
The Tetra Pakllcaseprovides a synthesis of abuses involving competition
covered by article 82 (ex 86);33 use of this case can provide the court guidance
from which to view the actions of Microsoft in each of the above circumstances. The withholding of technical information to the detriment of
Netscape can be placed into the second category of abuse involving a
dominated market where the effects are felt on another market in which
Microsoft does not hold a dominant position. The refusals to deal with
original equipment manufacturers who began to compete with Microsoft or

2" See United Brands, [1978] 1 C.M.L.R. at 435.
2 See Irish Sugar, 1999 E.C.R. 11-2969 (1999).
z See EC TREATY art. 82(d) (ex 86(d)).
2" See United States v. Microsoft, Corp., 84 F. Supp. 2d 9, 48-49 (D.D.C. 1999).
2W See Tetra Pak, [1997] 4 C.M.L.R. at 677 (factors listed supra note 223).
3 See United States v. Microsoft, Corp., 84 F. Supp. 2d 9,48 (D.D.C. 1999).
301 See

Dominant position, infra Part V.A.(3).

3 See United States v. Microsoft, Corp., 84 F. Supp. 2d 9, 98-99 (D.D.C. 1999).
3 See Tetra Pak II, 4 C.M.L.R. at 677 (categories listed supra note 201).

2001]

MICRosoFT & THE EU

threatened the barriers to entry fall into the first category covering abuses in
the same market as the dominant position.
The tying arrangement and pricing actions surrounding the development
and marketing of Internet Explorer could be placed either into the third
category, involving abuses committed in markets where there is no dominant
position in order to strengthen a position in a dominated market, or the fourth,
involving abuses in a market separate from but related to and connected with
the dominated market. 3" Finally, the actions toward Sun Microsystems could
be covered by either the second (same as Netscape) or the fourth (same as the
Explorer tying arrangement) categories. When any one, few, or all of the
above actions are found to be an abuse of a dominant position, Microsoft
could face a significant fine for violation of European Union laws, a penalty
which is less likely appealed or negotiated than the structural remedies often
proposed in the U.S. courts.
A. Essential FacilityDoctrine
The courts of the European Union also have the possibility of condemning
Microsoft for abuse of control of an essential facility. Windows operating
system and the technical information accompanying it can be considered an
asset necessary for the participation in a market, an essential facility." 5 Any
refusal of access to the facility would be anticompetitive, and furthermore the
use of control over the essential facility to create advantages over competitors
can be condemned as abuse of a dominant position."° Microsoft's repeated
denials of access to information3. 7 and use of Windows to leverage into other
markets or prevent others from doing so,' °s constitute use of an essential
facility to procure advantages over competitors. It is also noteworthy that
European law often requires intellectual property rights to yield to larger
societal concerns, such as market preservation?" The policy goals of
preserving the common market would prevent Microsoft from arguing that
access to Windows and related information on a non-discriminatory basis
would interfere with its rights and ability to compete.

" This fourth category isthe same category that covered the abuses condemned in the Tetra
case.
" See Harz, supra note 153, at 223.
306 See id.

307
308

See United States v. Microsoft, Corp., 84 F. Supp. 2d 9,35, 39,47-48, 54 (D.D.C. 1999).
See id. at 35, 39-40, 46.

o See Harz, supra note 153, at 223.

GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L.

[Vol. 30: 101

B. Lack of Justification
Several of Microsoft's arguments against the findings are also likely to
prove unsuccessful in the European courts even if the court is persuaded into
using a balancing test. Whether viewed from an essential facilities perspective
or not, it is unlikely that Microsoft will be able to justify the actions taken as
a proper exercise of its intellectual property rights. Since the European system
places a special responsibility on dominant firms in dealing with competitors,
it is clear that abuses damaging the common market are given greater concern
than interference with property rights.
The European courts can equally dismiss other justifications. Microsoft
has argued that the activities such as bundling Internet Explorer with Windows
and encouraging other developers to make Windows-compatible products
increases efficiencies.3 1 The justification will prove as unsuccessful in the
European courts as in the U.S. district court. Additionally, the justification,
even if accepted, is still insufficient to override the policy of market protection
in the European Union. The court is more likely to value preservation of
competitors and businesses over market efficiencies. 3 '
Microsoft also contends that its actions promoted innovation by encouraging the development of additional Windows-compatible technologies and
forcing firms such as Netscape to continually reexamine their products. 31 2 The
argument follows that increased innovation furthers competition and provides
an overall benefit to consumers. The European court is likely to reject
innovation as an argument for reasons similar to the rejection of arguments
surrounding efficiency. The focus of the enforcement of articles 81 (ex 85)
and 82 (ex 86) is to preserve competitors before competition. 3'3 Finally,
arguments that the technology industry is rapidly changing and no firm can
truly hold a dominant position will also fail. Unlike American courts, the
European courts are not as concerned with how the dominant position came
to be acquired or could be lost, but rather they focus on whether a firm is in a
position of market power and has abused that position. 4

See United States v. Microsoft, Corp., 84 F. Supp. 2d 9, 57 (D.C.C. 1999).
" See KORAH, supra note 176, at 10.
312 See United States v. Microsoft, Corp., 84 F. Supp. 2d 9, 57 (D.D.C. 1999).
m See Kareff, supra note 165, at 554.
3 See Jebsen & Stevens, supra note 38, at 488.
310
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C. Structure
The structure of the European courts also points to a result against
Microsoft. The fact that article 82 (ex 86) is given such broad interpretation
and application and the courts are given a broad grant of authority increases
the likelihood that Microsoft can be reached and condemned under their
authority. Furthermore, since the European Union generally does not pursue
structural relief like the United States but instead imposes a fine,31 5 it is
unlikely that Microsoft will desire to spend large amounts of capital in a
vigorous and lengthy European court battle. 6
D. History
The most interesting and perhaps most reliable basis from which to draw
predictions and comparison is history itself. When compared to the case
involving IBM, a quick result against Microsoft is more likely to occur. Much
like IBM in the 1960s and 70s,3" 7 Microsoft shows no sign of ending the rather
lengthy process that has become the U.S. antitrust action, now in its eleventh
year."' The government undertook both the Microsoft claim and the IBM
claim rather begrudgingly, following the urging or the filing of complaints by
competitors.3t 9 In continuance of the pressure on the Department of Justice
regarding Microsoft, America Online and other competitors have filed a brief
continuing to argue in favor of a Microsoft breakup.32
Although the trouble in the European courts appeared less severe than in
the United States, the case was much more clearly stacked against IBM;
Microsoft now faces the similar situation. The arguments with which IBM
was attempting to justify its actions are the same arguments Microsoft is
advancing: market efficiency, innovation and competition. 321' IBM settled
likely from the realization of the ineffectiveness of these arguments in

"' The fine imposed by European Courts should not be trivialized as "soft." The courts can
impose fines up to ten percent of the company's turnover in addition to injunctive relief. In the
case of Microsoft the amount could reach $230 million. See Dominance, supra note 1.
316See Jebsen & Stevens, supra note 38, at 448.
"

See Lopatka, supra note 128, at 145.

323See Cassidy, supra note 9.
329See Hawker, supra note 11, at 1; Lopatka, supra note 128, at 149.

0 See Clare Haney, AOL, Others File Brief Arguing in Favor of Microsoft Breakup,
INFOWORLD DAILY NEWS, Jan. 15, 2001.
322 See Lopatka, supra note 128, at 156; see also Microsoft Appellate Brief at Microsoft Press
Pass, supra note 24.
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European courts that are focused on the preservation of a community market
and of small and medium businesses; Microsoft's arguments will prove no
more persuasive. The European courts were also able to pursue IBM with a
clear idea of redress, thus lessening the chance of a lengthy fight." With the
high likelihood that Microsoft will be found to have abused its dominant
position, the penalties established by the European system remain clear-cut.
Parallels to the IBM dismissal in the United States can also be drawn from
recent political developments. The European antitrust procedure, based upon
treaty law, is governed much more by the discretion of courts and thus is less
affected by changes in national political climates. The recent election of
George W. Bush as President of the United States led to the appointment of
John Ashcroft as Attorney General. 3 and Charles James as Justice Department
Antitrust Chief.3 " Although most experts agree that the case has gone too far
to be completely dropped, critics argue that should Microsoft continue to
prevail the case would not be appealed by the government or the entire case
could be settled on terms favorable to Microsoft.325 The IBM case was
similarly dismissed following a shift to the right in the political climate.
Following the dismissal of IBM, the European courts continued to proceed and
are likely to continue to proceed against Microsoft resulting in a condemnation
or a quick, yet strict settlement.
VI. CONCLUSION

Given Microsoft's global presence, it is unlikely that its antitrust problems
will cease any time in the near future. The United States appears doomed to
(or arguably already has) repeat its past mistakes and drag an enforcement
action over decades with no clear sign of relief. Following the filing in the
United States other countries and regions have begun investigations of their
own. Although a certain forecast of every outcome is impossible, a prediction
can be made as to the result that is most likely to occur in the E.U. given
several factors.
Past examples of antitrust enforcement of massive technological firms on
both sides of the Atlantic Ocean reveal a pattern the current action is likely to
follow. The findings of fact of the U.S. district court can be applied to the
31 See Jebsen & Stevens, supra note 38, at 447.
32 See Kelly Zito, Ashcroft Unlikely to Drop Microsoft Case, But Experts Say He Might Turn

Down the Heat, S.F. CHRON., Jan. 16, 2001, at DI.
324 See Larry Margasak, Gov't, Microsoft to Battle in Court, AssOcIATED PRESs, Feb.
26,
2001.
32 See id.
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European structural system and conclusions can be drawn based on European
case law and policy goals. When combined, it becomes apparent that
Microsoft is likely to either settle the European case quickly to avoid public
condemnation or will receive an unfavorable verdict and be subjected to the
requisite penalties. The case would therefore show again the ability of the
European Union to accomplish what U.S. antitrust enforcers either should not
attempt or cannot conclude.

